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1 Introduction
It has long been recognized that the supply of new engineers is cyclical over time.
There are periods when engineering schools attract many students, followed by
periods when they attract only few. As Freeman and Leonard (1978) have shown,
enrollment cycles do not occur in the …eld of engineering only. They identify them
in physics, mathematics, chemistry, and education as well. The cycles observed
in these …elds are dampened over time. In the absence of exogenous shocks they
disappear after a couple of years. This phenomenon can also be observed in
countries with educational systems di¤erent from the one in the United States.
Cycles can be found in Germany, for example, which is illustrated in …gure 1.
The …rst model explaining this phenomenon was proposed by Richard Free-
man (1971, 1972, 1975a, 1975b, 1976a, 1976b). His model is based on the assump-
tions of myopic wage expectations and occupational immobility.1 We illustrate
the model taking the engineering profession as an example. Assume that in an
initial period there is an excess demand for engineers. It cannot be satis…ed by
physicists, mathematicians, or other college graduates who are occupationally im-
mobile. As a consequence, the wage for engineers is high in this period. Because
high school graduates are myopic, they believe it will stay high forever. Thus a
large number of them enrolls in engineering schools, entering the marketplace in
the next period. The excess demand then changes into an excess supply. It can-
not be removed by the switching of engineers into other professions. Therefore
the wage for engineers is low in this period. Because myopic high school gradu-
ates expect it to stay low forever, only few of them enroll in engineering schools
this time. The following period is therefore characterized by an excess demand
again. Then the process repeats, generating a cobweb pattern of engineering
employment.
Freeman’s model is not undisputed. One of the controversial points is whether
wage expectations are really myopic. Some evidence supports this hypothesis.
Le-er and Lindsay (1979), for example, …nd that students in medicine base their
wage forecasts on current wages. Leonard (1982) shows that personnel executives
even in large …rms tend to badly forecast future salaries. Other evidence rejects
the hypothesis of myopic wage expectations, supporting the hypothesis of rational
wage expectations instead. Willis and Rosen (1979) show that high school gradu-
ates can correctly compare future lifetime earnings associated with a high school
diploma and future lifetime earnings associated with a college diploma. Ho¤-
man and Low (1983) …nd that students in economics can forecast future earnings
opportunities very well. Garen (1984) presents evidence implying that young
males can correctly forecast lifetime earnings associated with di¤erent levels of
schooling. Siow (1984) shows that law students are good predictors of lifetime
1In a more sophisticated version of Freeman’s model, wage expectations are adaptive. This
does not make a big di¤erence, however.
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Figure 1: First-Year Students in Engineering, West Germany, 1974 to 1991
Source: Federal Statistical O¢ce, Statistical Yearbook of the Federal Republic
of Germany
earnings. Berger (1988) presents similar …ndings for college majors in general.
Orazem and Mattila (1991), …nally, show that high school graduates are not only
able to predict the …rst moment of the future earnings distribution, but also the
second one. So several (though not all) studies suggest that wage expectations
are rational and not myopic.2
In response to this evidence, Gary Zarkin (1982, 1983, 1985) developed an-
other model aimed at explaining cycles in occupational choice. In his model the
assumption of myopic wage expectations is replaced by that of rational wage ex-
pectations so that occupations are ranked by future expected lifetime earnings
and not by current periodical earnings. The assumption of occupational immo-
bility is not replaced in the model. For an intuitive understanding, return to
the example of the engineering profession. Assume that in an initial period the
stock of engineers is low and that it cannot be increased by physicists or other
professionals switching into the market for engineers. High school graduates then
expect to receive lifetime earnings relatively high when entering the engineering
profession. So many of them enroll in engineering schools. As a consequence, the
number of new engineers is high in the subsequent period, possibly even higher
than the number of old engineers retiring from working life. Since it is not pos-
sible for new engineers to switch into another occupation, the stock of engineers
increases in this case. High school graduates therefore expect to receive lifetime
earnings relatively low when entering the engineering profession. Therefore, rela-
tively few of them enroll in engineering schools during this phase. In the following
period the number of new engineers thus is low, possibly not even high enough
to replace retirees. So the stock of engineers decreases, and expected lifetime
2There is also a study rejecting both the hypothesis of myopic and the hypothesis of rational
wage expectations. Betts (1996) …nds that only a minority of students is able to accurately
rank four di¤erent occupations by starting salary.
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earnings rise again. At this point the process repeats, generating equilibrium
cycles in the market for new engineers.3
There is some criticism to Zarkin’s model too. The critique refers to the
empirical relevance of the assumption of occupational immobility. Many studies
…nd that the degree of occupational mobility is quite high. Börsch-Supan (1990),
for example, presents evidence implying that 67 percent of all household heads
leave a one digit occupation once or more in 15 years.4 Velling and Bender (1994)
show that 13 percent of all employees leave a two digit occupation once a year.
Harper (1995) reports that 11 percent of males in the labor force leave a three digit
occupation once a year and that 7 percent do so voluntarily. Mertens (1997) …nds
occupational turnover rates of 7 percent a year where occupations are de…ned on
the one digit level. Dolton and Kidd (1998), …nally, present evidence implying
that 24 percent of male college graduates leave a three digit occupation within
the …rst eight years of their working life. This suggests that the assumption of
occupational immobility is not consistent with the evidence.
In this paper we present a model which takes this critique seriously. Our model
avoids the assumptions of myopic wage expectations and occupational immobility
and replaces them by the assumptions of rational wage expectations and perfect
occupational mobility. We show that even a model based on these assumptions
is able to explain the cyclical behavior of occupational choice observed in many
professional labor markets. To simplify the presentation, we proceed in two steps:
In the …rst step, which is found in section 2, we only replace the assumption of
myopic wage expectations. In the second step, which is found in section 3, we
also abandon the assumption of occupational immobility.
2 A Model with Rational Wage Expectations
and Occupational Immobility
Our model is a simple overlapping generations model. In each period a new
generation of individuals is born. All generations are equal in size. The size of
each generation is normalized to one. Individuals live for two periods. In the
…rst period of life they choose one out of two occupations. In the second period
of life they are occupationally immobile and stick to the occupation chosen when
young.5 Occupational choice is made in such a way that lifetime earnings are
3Sometimes the model developed by Zarkin is mentioned in one breath with a model de-
veloped by Siow (1984). However, Siow’s model can only generate random ‡uctuations in
occupational choice. Cycles cannot be generated by the model.
4Studies de…ning occupations on a one/two/three digit level can distinguish up to
ten/hundred/thousand di¤erent occupational categories.
5We ignore an extra period when individuals attend college. Such a period could easily
be introduced into the model, but it would merely increase complexity without yielding any
additional insights.
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maximized.6 Individuals are hired by …rms. In each period …rms thus employ two
generations of individuals in two types of occupations. They use the resulting
four types of labor to produce a single good. Production is organized so that
pro…ts are maximized.
To …nd the competitive equilibrium of the model, we can either examine the
decentralized version of the economy, which is rather tedious and relegated to
appendix A, or we can examine the centralized version of the economy, which is
much simpler and the way chosen here. The central planner organizes production
e¢ciently. He thus maximizes the present value of production
1X
t=1
½t¡1F
¡
NAt ; N
AA
t ; N
B
t ; N
BB
t
¢
(1)
subject to the complementary constraint, the immobility constraints, and the
initial condition
NBt = 1¡NAt ; (2a)
NAAt = N
A
t¡1; (2b)
NBBt = N
B
t¡1; (2c)
NA0 = given (2d)
where t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g is time, ½ 2 (0; 1) is an exogenous discount factor, F 2
[0;1) is a well-behaved production function, NAt 2 [0; 1] is the number of young
individuals working in occupation A, NAAt 2 [0; 1] is the corresponding number
of old individuals, NBt 2 [0; 1] is the number of young individuals working in
occupation B, and NBBt 2 [0; 1] is the corresponding number of old individuals.7
The complementary constraint says that individuals who do not enter A will enter
B. The immobility constraints say that old individuals stick to the occupation
chosen when young. The initial condition says that the occupational allocation
from period zero is predetermined by the time of period one (the planning period).
To …nd the solution of the maximization problem, we insert the constraints
from (2a), (2b), and (2c) in the objective function from (1). So we get
1X
t=1
½t¡1F
¡
NAt ; N
A
t¡1; 1¡NAt ; 1¡NAt¡1
¢
: (3)
6Alternatively we could assume occupational choice to be made such that lifetime utility is
maximized. However, in this case individuals might react hesitantly to imbalances in lifetime
earnings. In a model with perfect occupational mobility the assumption of maximizing lifetime
utility is therefore not appropriate.
7For a better understanding of our notation, note that in the next section we will introduce
the variables NABt and N
BA
t . They denote the number of individuals changing the occupation
when they enter their second period of life.
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The necessary condition for an inner maximum then is
F1 (Xt) + ½F2 (Xt+1) = F3 (Xt) + ½F4 (Xt+1) (4)
with
Xt ´
¡
NAt ; N
A
t¡1; 1¡NAt ; 1¡NAt¡1
¢
(5)
for t 2 f1; 2; 3; :::g. It says that lifetime marginal productivities and, hence,
lifetime earnings must equalize across occupations.
The condition of equal lifetime earnings given in (4) determines the dynamics
of NAt . Since we are only interested in linear dynamics,
8 we compute the …rst-
order Taylor approximation of the necessary condition around the steady state.
As a result we get the linear second-order di¤erence equation
G1
¡
NAt+1 ¡NA
¢
+G2
¡
NAt ¡NA
¢
+G3
¡
NAt¡1 ¡NA
¢
= 0 (6)
where
G1 ´ ½F21 ¡ ½F23 ¡ ½F41 + ½F43; (7a)
G2 ´ F11 ¡ F13 ¡ F31 + F33 + ½F22 ¡ ½F24 ¡ ½F42 + ½F44; (7b)
G3 ´ F12 ¡ F14 ¡ F32 + F34 (7c)
and where the second partial derivatives of F are evaluated at the steady state.
Note that the shorthand variables G1, G2, and G3 may have any numerical value.
The only thing we can say about them is that G1 = ½G3.
Because we do not know the numerical value of G1, we must distinguish
between two cases. Let us …rst turn to the case where G1 = 0. As G1 = ½G3,
we also have G3 = 0 in this case. So the di¤erence equation from (6) reduces to
NAt = N
A. We see that the number of young individuals entering A is on the
steady state level in each period. The number is stationary, cycles in occupational
choice do not arise. The model cannot explain the evidence in this case. For this
reason we ignore the case from now on.
We now turn to the case where G1 6= 0. In this case it is possible to rewrite
the di¤erence equation from (6) as¡
NAt+1 ¡NA
¢
+H1
¡
NAt ¡NA
¢
+H2
¡
NAt¡1 ¡NA
¢
= 0 (8)
where
H1 ´ G2
G1
=
F11 ¡ F13 ¡ F31 + F33 + ½F22 ¡ ½F24 ¡ ½F42 + ½F44
½F21 ¡ ½F23 ¡ ½F41 + ½F43 ; (9a)
H2 ´ G3
G1
=
F12 ¡ F14 ¡ F32 + F34
½F21 ¡ ½F23 ¡ ½F41 + ½F43 =
1
½
> 1 (9b)
8We ignore the case of nonlinear dynamics because the empirical …ndings of Freeman and
Leonard (1978) imply that the economy converges to the steady state. In the neighborhood of
the steady state it is su¢cient to study linear dynamics.
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R1 R2
sign abs sign abs
H1 2 (¡1;¡1¡H2) distinct real roots > 0 < 1 > 0 > 1
H1 = ¡1¡H2 distinct real roots > 0 = 1 > 0 > 1
H1 2
¡¡1¡H2;¡2pH2¢ distinct real roots > 0 > 1 > 0 > 1
H1 = ¡2
p
H2 identical real roots > 0 > 1 > 0 > 1
H1 2
¡¡2pH2; 2pH2¢ conjugate complex roots > 1 > 1
H1 = 2
p
H2 identical real roots < 0 > 1 < 0 > 1
H1 2
¡
2
p
H2; 1 +H2
¢
distinct real roots < 0 > 1 < 0 > 1
H1 = 1 +H2 distinct real roots < 0 > 1 < 0 = 1
H1 2 (1 +H2;1) distinct real roots < 0 > 1 < 0 < 1
Table 1: The Sign and the Absolute Value of the Characteristic Roots as a
Function of the Unknown H1
are two additional shorthand variables. Because we do not know the numerical
value of G1 and G2, we do not know the value of H1. We know the value of H2,
however, which is equal to 1=½ > 1.
We can solve the di¤erence equation from (8) with standard methods. The
general solution of the di¤erence equation is
NAt ¡NA =
½
C1R
t
1 + C2R
t
2 if H1 6= ¡2
p
H2;
C1R
t
1 + C2R
t
2t if H1 = ¡2
p
H2
(10)
where C1 and C2 are arbitrary constants and R1 and R2 are the characteristic
roots
R1 = ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2; (11a)
R2 = ¡H1
2
+
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2: (11b)
We analyze the roots in appendix B. The results of the analysis are listed in table
1. As the table shows, the sign and the absolute value of the roots depend on the
numerical value of the unknown H1.
To derive the de…nite solution of the di¤erence equation, we need two bound-
ary conditions. One is given by the initial condition
NA0 = given; (12)
which is already known from (2d). The other one is assumed to be
lim
t!1
NAt = N
A; (13)
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time
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Figure 2: The Time Path of the Number of Young Individuals Entering Occupa-
tion A if H1 2 (1 +H2;1)
which says that agents expect the economy to converge to the steady state. We
could have modelled expectations in any other way, but this way is the only one
consistent with the fact that cycles in occupational choice are dampened over
time.
As shown in table 1, the economy cannot converge to the steady state if
H1 2 [¡1¡H2; 1 +H2].9 In this case both roots are equal to or larger than one
in absolute value so that convergence is impossible. A de…nite solution satisfying
the boundary conditions in (12) and (13) does not exist in this case. If H1 =2
[¡1¡H2; 1 +H2], one root is smaller than one in absolute value, however, and
convergence is possible. If H1 2 (¡1;¡1¡H2), the converging root is positive
so that the resulting time path of NAt is monotonic. If H1 2 (1 +H2;1), the
converging root is negative so that the time path is oscillatory. The de…nite
solution then is
NAt ¡NA =
¡
NA0 ¡NA
¢
Rt2: (14)
In this case the model generates cycles in occupational choice which are similar to
those we can observe in reality. The number of individuals entering A is cyclical,
and cycles are dampened over time. An example for this type of dynamic behavior
is given in …gure 2.
What does the condition H1 2 (1 +H2;1) mean? As the de…nitions of H1
and H2 in (9) show, it basically is a technological condition. Given the discount
factor ½, it restricts the set of production functions compatible with dampened
cycles in occupational choice. A realistic family of production functions satisfying
the condition is de…ned by the following three properties:10
9This statement is perfectly true only for the linear model. In the nonlinear model conver-
gence is impossible if H1 2 (¡1 ¡ H2; 1 + H2). The reason for this deviation is that the two
versions of the model need not be topologically equivalent at H1 2 f¡1 ¡ H2; 1 + H2g.
10In the following de…nition we use the term substitutes in the sense of Edgeworth or Auspitz-
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1. Workers who belong to the same occupational group are substitutes, im-
plying that F11 < 0, F12 < 0, F21 < 0, F22 < 0, F33 < 0, F34 < 0, F43 < 0,
F44 < 0.
2. Workers who belong to di¤erent occupational groups are complements, im-
plying that F13 > 0, F14 > 0, F23 > 0, F24 > 0, F31 > 0, F32 > 0, F41 > 0,
F42 > 0.
3. Workers who belong to the same occupational and generational group are
own-substitutes su¢ciently close, implying that F11 ¿ 0, F22 ¿ 0, F33 ¿ 0,
F44 ¿ 0.
It is easy to see from (9) that for production functions from this family the
condition H1 2 (1 +H2;1) is satis…ed.
If we stay with this type of production function for another moment, we can
easily explain the intuition of our model. Assume that in an initial period there
are many old workers in A and few old workers in B. Because young workers in
A are substitutes for old workers in A and complements to old workers in B, this
implies that young workers who enter A receive low lifetime earnings. Because
young workers in B are complements to old workers in A and substitutes for
old workers in B, this also implies that young workers who enter B receive high
lifetime earnings. So only few young workers enter A and many young workers
enter B. In the next period the number of old workers in A thus is low and
the number of old workers in B is high. The scheme of substitutability and
complementarity then implies that young workers receive high lifetime earnings
when entering A and low lifetime earnings when entering B. So many young
workers choose A and few young workers choose B. The following period thus
is characterized by a high number of old workers in A and a low number of
old workers in B again. At this point the process repeats, generating cycles in
occupational choice.
3 A Model with Rational Wage Expectations
and Perfect Occupational Mobility
Critical to the model presented in the last section is the assumption that old indi-
viduals are occupationally immobile. Now we abandon this assumption and allow
for perfect occupational mobility. In each period we thus have young individuals
entering A or B (called entrants), old individuals staying in A or B (called stay-
ers), and old individuals switching from A to B or from B to A (called switchers).
Firms employ these six types of workers. What is the competitive equilibrium?
Lieben substitutes. Similarly, we use the term complements in the sense of Edgeworth or
Auspitz-Lieben complements.
8
Again the competitive equilibrium can easier be found by employing the con-
cept of the central planner (for the decentralized version of the economy see
appendix A). The central planner maximizes
1X
t=1
½t¡1F
¡
NAt ;N
AA
t ;N
B
t ; N
BB
t ; N
AB
t ;N
BA
t
¢
(15)
subject to the constraints
NBt = 1¡NAt ; (16a)
NAAt = N
A
t¡1 ¡NABt ; (16b)
NBBt = N
B
t¡1 ¡NBAt ; (16c)
NA0 = given (16d)
where NABt 2
£
0;NAt¡1
¤
and NBAt 2
£
0; NBt¡1
¤
are the numbers of old individuals
switching from A to B and from B to A. Note that the production function has
six arguments now [compare (15) to (1)]. Note also that we have two switching
constraints instead of two immobility constraints [compare (16b) and (16c) to (2b)
and (2c)]. The switching constraints say that the number of stayers by de…nition
is equal to the number of former entrants minus the number of switchers.
To solve the maximization problem, we insert the constraints from (16a),
(16b), and (16c) into the objective function from (15):
1X
t=1
½t¡1F
¡
NAt ; N
A
t¡1 ¡NABt ; 1¡NAt ; 1¡NAt¡1 ¡NBAt ; NABt ;NBAt
¢
: (17)
The necessary conditions for an inner maximum then are
F1 (Xt) + ½F2 (Xt+1) = F3 (Xt) + ½F4 (Xt+1) ; (18a)
F2 (Xt) = F5 (Xt) ; (18b)
F4 (Xt) = F6 (Xt) (18c)
with
Xt ´
¡
NAt ;N
A
t¡1 ¡NABt ; 1¡NAt ; 1¡NAt¡1 ¡NBAt ; NABt ;NBAt
¢
(19)
for t 2 f1; 2; 3; :::g. They imply that lifetime earnings must equalize across occu-
pations, and that periodical earnings must equalize across stayers and switchers.
The necessary conditions determine the dynamics of NAt , N
AB
t , and N
BA
t .
Restricting ourselves again to the linear dynamic case, we compute the …rst-
order Taylor approximation of the necessary conditions around the steady state.
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This leads to the system of linear second-order di¤erence equations
0@ G11 G12 G13 G14 G15 G16 G170 0 0 G24 G25 G26 G27
0 0 0 G34 G35 G36 G37
1A
0BBBBBBBB@
NAt+1 ¡NA
NABt+1 ¡NAB
NBAt+1 ¡NBA
NAt ¡NA
NABt ¡NAB
NBAt ¡NBA
NAt¡1 ¡NA
1CCCCCCCCA
=
0@ 00
0
1A (20)
where
G11 ´ ½F21 ¡ ½F23 ¡ ½F41 + ½F43; (21a)
G12 ´ ¡½F22 + ½F25 + ½F42 ¡ ½F45; (21b)
G13 ´ ¡½F24 + ½F26 + ½F44 ¡ ½F46; (21c)
G14 ´ F11 ¡ F13 + ½F22 ¡ ½F24 ¡ F31 + F33 ¡ ½F42 + ½F44; (21d)
G15 ´ ¡F12 + F15 + F32 ¡ F35; (21e)
G16 ´ ¡F14 + F16 + F34 ¡ F36; (21f)
G17 ´ F12 ¡ F14 ¡ F32 + F34; (21g)
G24 ´ F21 ¡ F23 ¡ F51 + F53; (21h)
G25 ´ ¡F22 + F25 + F52 ¡ F55; (21i)
G26 ´ ¡F24 + F26 + F54 ¡ F56; (21j)
G27 ´ F22 ¡ F24 ¡ F52 + F54; (21k)
G34 ´ F41 ¡ F43 ¡ F61 + F63; (21l)
G35 ´ ¡F42 + F45 + F62 ¡ F65; (21m)
G36 ´ ¡F44 + F46 + F64 ¡ F66; (21n)
G37 ´ F42 ¡ F44 ¡ F62 + F64: (21o)
Note that some Gij’s are related to each other:
G11 = ½G17; (22a)
G12 = ¡½G27; (22b)
G13 = ¡½G37; (22c)
G15 = ¡G24; (22d)
G16 = ¡G34; (22e)
G26 = G35: (22f)
More information about these variables is not available. In particular, we cannot
tell anything about their numerical value.
We now use the system of di¤erence equations to derive a single di¤erence
equation that governs the dynamics of NAt . For this purpose we rewrite the
10
system, taking into account that the last two equations, which refer to t and
t¡ 1, also refer to t+ 1 and t:
0BBBB@
G11 G12 G13 G14 G15 G16 G17
0 0 0 G24 G25 G26 G27
0 0 0 G34 G35 G36 G37
G24 G25 G26 G27 0 0 0
G34 G35 G36 G37 0 0 0
1CCCCA
0BBBBBBBB@
NAt+1 ¡NA
NABt+1 ¡NAB
NBAt+1 ¡NBA
NAt ¡NA
NABt ¡NAB
NBAt ¡NBA
NAt¡1 ¡NA
1CCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBB@
0
0
0
0
0
1CCCCA : (23)
Then we rearrange the system as follows:0BBBB@
G11 G12 G13 G15 G16
0 0 0 G25 G26
0 0 0 G35 G36
G24 G25 G26 0 0
G34 G35 G36 0 0
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
NAt+1 ¡NA
NABt+1 ¡NAB
NBAt+1 ¡NBA
NABt ¡NAB
NBAt ¡NBA
1CCCCA =
¡
0BBBB@
G14 G17
G24 G27
G34 G37
G27 0
G37 0
1CCCCA
µ
NAt ¡NA
NAt¡1 ¡NA
¶
: (24)
Now we apply Cramer’s rule to solve the system for NAt+1 ¡NA.11 So we get
NAt+1 ¡NA = ¡H11
¡
NAt ¡NA
¢ ¡H12 ¡NAt¡1 ¡NA¢ (25)
with
H11 ´
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
G14 G12 G13 G15 G16
G24 0 0 G25 G26
G34 0 0 G35 G36
G27 G25 G26 0 0
G37 G35 G36 0 0
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
G11 G12 G13 G15 G16
0 0 0 G25 G26
0 0 0 G35 G36
G24 G25 G26 0 0
G34 G35 G36 0 0
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
; (26a)
11We assume that the determinant of the coe¢cient matrix on the left of (24) is di¤erent
from zero. This way we exclude special cases similar to that we encountered in the last section.
There occupational choice was stationary if G1 = 0.
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H12 ´
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
G17 G12 G13 G15 G16
G27 0 0 G25 G26
G37 0 0 G35 G36
0 G25 G26 0 0
0 G35 G36 0 0
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
G11 G12 G13 G15 G16
0 0 0 G25 G26
0 0 0 G35 G36
G24 G25 G26 0 0
G34 G35 G36 0 0
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
: (26b)
Equation (25) is the di¤erence equation we have looked for. Note that it is free
from the switching variables NABt and N
BA
t . Although we allow for occupational
switches in this model, the corresponding variables do not appear in the di¤erence
equation governing the dynamics of NAt . As a result, the di¤erence equation we
get in this section is very similar to that obtained in the last section [compare (25)
to (8)]. The two di¤erence equations have the same structure, and they share an
identical coe¢cient. By inserting (22) into (26b) and expanding determinants,
we can see that H12 is equal to 1=½ and, thus, to H2. Any di¤erence between the
model with and the model without occupational mobility thus is re‡ected in the
di¤erence between H11 and H1.
Since the two di¤erence equations are nearly identical, we can solve them
in the same way. By following the procedure described in the last section, we
…nd that the time path of NAt exhibits dampened cycles if the condition H11 2
(1 +H12;1) is satis…ed. This condition again has a technological character. It
restricts the set of production functions compatible with dampened cycles in
occupational choice. Let us examine if the family of production functions de…ned
by the following three properties satis…es the condition:
1. Workers who currently belong to the same occupational group are substi-
tutes, implying that F11 < 0, F12 < 0, F16 < 0, F21 < 0, F22 < 0, F26 < 0,
F33 < 0, F34 < 0, F35 < 0, F43 < 0, F44 < 0, F45 < 0, F53 < 0, F54 < 0,
F55 < 0, F61 < 0, F62 < 0, F66 < 0.
2. Workers who currently belong to di¤erent occupational groups are comple-
ments, implying that F13 > 0, F14 > 0, F15 > 0, F23 > 0, F24 > 0, F25 > 0,
F31 > 0, F32 > 0, F36 > 0, F41 > 0, F42 > 0, F46 > 0, F51 > 0, F52 > 0,
F56 > 0, F63 > 0, F64 > 0, F65 > 0.
3. Workers who belong to the same occupational, generational, and transi-
tional group are own-substitutes su¢ciently close, implying that F11 ¿ 0,
F22 ¿ 0, F33 ¿ 0, F44 ¿ 0, F55 ¿ 0, F66 ¿ 0.
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In the previous section it was easy to see that the example family of production
functions satis…es the condition for dampened cycles in occupational choice. This
time it is rather di¢cult to see this although the families are very similar in
both sections. Therefore we approached the problem numerically. We assigned
numerical values to F11; F12; ::: that conformed to the pattern de…ned by the
three properties. We also assigned a value to ½. Then we computed H11 and
H12 and checked if the cycle condition was satis…ed. We found that for some
parameterizations it was, while for others it was not.12 So the family of production
functions de…ned above does not satisfy the cycle condition in any case. In many
cases the condition is met, however. Cycles in occupational choice therefore are
possible even if occupational mobility is perfect among workers.
4 Conclusion
Many professional labor markets exhibit systematic ups and downs. There are
periods when many new workers enter these markets, followed by periods when
there are only few entrants. This phenomenon can be observed on the markets
for engineers, physicists, mathematicians, and others. Richard Freeman (1971,
1972, 1975a, 1975b, 1976a, 1976b) has proposed to explain the phenomenon by
means of a cobweb model based on the assumptions of myopic wage expecta-
tions and occupational immobility. However, some evidence suggests that wage
expectations are rational and not myopic. Students in economics and law, for
example, have been shown to form their wage expectations rationally. In re-
sponse to this evidence, Gary Zarkin (1982, 1983, 1985) has proposed to explain
the phenomenon by means of a rational expectations model based only on the
assumption of occupational immobility. Nevertheless, there is reason to question
this assumption as well. Empirical studies report occupational turnover rates
between seven and thirteen percent a year. In the long run, about two thirds
of all workers seem to change their occupation even if occupations are de…ned
very broadly. Taking this evidence seriously, we have presented a model in this
paper which is neither based on the assumption of myopic wage expectations nor
on that of occupational immobility. It is based instead on the assumptions of
rational wage expectations and perfect occupational mobility. We have shown
that even a model based on these assumptions can explain the existence of cycles
in occupational choice. There are plausible technologies for which cycles do not
12We selected the numbers for Fij randomly. If Fij < 0 and i 6= j, the numbers were
uniformly drawn from the interval [¡1; 0]. If Fij < 0 and i = j, they were uniformly drawn
from [¡7:5;¡5]. If Fij > 0, they were uniformly drawn from [0; 1]. The number assigned to ½
was 0:5. We performed 100 experiments. The condition for converging cycles was satis…ed in
53 cases, in 47 cases it was not. When the model generated cycles, they were weaker than in
the model with occupational immobility. When it did not generate cycles, the time path was
nevertheless converging. Since the model is quite abstract, one should not overemphasize the
numerical results.
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disappear if workers are allowed to change their occupation.
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Appendix A
Here we examine the decentralized versions of the models presented in sections
2 and 3. We begin with the model from section 2. In this model, individuals
behave as follows:
NAt 2
8<: f0g if W
A
t + ½W
AA
t+1 < W
B
t + ½W
BB
t+1 ;
[0; 1] if WAt + ½W
AA
t+1 = W
B
t + ½W
BB
t+1 ;
f1g if WAt + ½WAAt+1 > WBt + ½WBBt+1 ;
NBt = 1¡NAt ;
NAAt = N
A
t¡1;
NBBt = N
B
t¡1:
The variables WAt , W
AA
t , W
B
t , W
BB
t denote the wages paid to young workers in
A, old workers in A, young workers in B, old workers in B. The …rms’ behavior
is described by
WAt = F1
¡
NAt ; N
AA
t ; N
B
t ; N
BB
t
¢
;
WAAt = F2
¡
NAt ; N
AA
t ; N
B
t ; N
BB
t
¢
;
WBt = F3
¡
NAt ; N
AA
t ; N
B
t ; N
BB
t
¢
;
WBBt = F4
¡
NAt ; N
AA
t ; N
B
t ; N
BB
t
¢
:
In the temporary equilibrium, both systems of equations must hold simultane-
ously. This implies
NAt 2
8<: f0g if F1 (Xt) + ½F2 (Xt+1) < F3 (Xt) + ½F4 (Xt+1) ;[0; 1] if F1 (Xt) + ½F2 (Xt+1) = F3 (Xt) + ½F4 (Xt+1) ;f1g if F1 (Xt) + ½F2 (Xt+1) > F3 (Xt) + ½F4 (Xt+1)
where
Xt ´
¡
NAt ;N
A
t¡1; 1¡NAt ; 1¡NAt¡1
¢
:
A temporary equilibrium exists if for each level of NAt+1 and N
A
t¡1 there is a
level of NAt satisfying this equation. This is the case by Kakutani’s …xed point
theorem. Given a suitable form of the production function, the equilibrium level
of NAt must be strictly between zero and one. So the temporary equilibrium is
characterized by
F1 (Xt) + ½F2 (Xt+1) = F3 (Xt) + ½F4 (Xt+1) :
This equilibrium condition corresponds to the maximum condition of the central
planner in (4). The results of the decentralized economy therefore are identical
to the results of the centralized economy.
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Now we turn to the model from section 3. Here the individuals’ behavior is
governed by
NAt 2
8>>>>><>>>>>:
f0g if W
A
t + ½max
©
WAAt+1;W
AB
t+1
ª
<
WBt + ½max
©
WBAt+1 ;W
BB
t+1
ª
;
[0; 1] if
WAt + ½max
©
WAAt+1;W
AB
t+1
ª
=
WBt + ½max
©
WBAt+1 ;W
BB
t+1
ª
;
f1g if W
A
t + ½max
©
WAAt+1;W
AB
t+1
ª
>
WBt + ½max
©
WBAt+1 ;W
BB
t+1
ª
;
NABt 2
8<: f0g if W
AB
t < W
AA
t ;£
0;NAt¡1
¤
if WABt =W
AA
t ;©
NAt¡1
ª
if WABt > W
AA
t ;
NBAt 2
8<: f0g if W
BA
t < W
BB
t ;£
0;NBt¡1
¤
if WBAt =W
BB
t ;©
NBt¡1
ª
if WBAt > W
BB
t ;
NBt = 1¡NAt ;
NAAt = N
A
t¡1 ¡NABt ;
NBBt = N
B
t¡1 ¡NBAt
where WABt and W
BA
t are the wages paid to individuals switching from A to B
or from B to A. The …rms’ behavior is de…ned by
WAt = F1
¡
NAt ;N
AA
t ;N
B
t ;N
BB
t ; N
AB
t ;N
BA
t
¢
;
WAAt = F2
¡
NAt ;N
AA
t ;N
B
t ;N
BB
t ; N
AB
t ;N
BA
t
¢
;
WBt = F3
¡
NAt ;N
AA
t ;N
B
t ;N
BB
t ; N
AB
t ;N
BA
t
¢
;
WBBt = F4
¡
NAt ;N
AA
t ;N
B
t ;N
BB
t ; N
AB
t ;N
BA
t
¢
;
WABt = F5
¡
NAt ;N
AA
t ;N
B
t ;N
BB
t ; N
AB
t ;N
BA
t
¢
;
WBAt = F6
¡
NAt ;N
AA
t ;N
B
t ;N
BB
t ; N
AB
t ;N
BA
t
¢
:
In the temporary equilibrium, both systems must hold simultaneously. This
implies
NAt 2
8>>>>>><>>>>>:
f0g if F1 (Xt) + ½max fF2 (Xt+1) ; F5 (Xt+1)g <
F3 (Xt) + ½max fF6 (Xt+1) ; F4 (Xt+1)g ;
[0; 1] if
F1 (Xt) + ½max fF2 (Xt+1) ; F5 (Xt+1)g =
F3 (Xt) + ½max fF6 (Xt+1) ; F4 (Xt+1)g ;
f1g if F1 (Xt) + ½max fF2 (Xt+1) ; F5 (Xt+1)g >
F3 (Xt) + ½max fF6 (Xt+1) ; F4 (Xt+1)g ;
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NABt 2
8<:
f0g if F5 (Xt) < F2 (Xt) ;£
0;NAt¡1
¤
if F5 (Xt) = F2 (Xt) ;©
NAt¡1
ª
if F5 (Xt) > F2 (Xt) ;
NBAt 2
8<: f0g if F6 (Xt) < F4 (Xt) ;£0; 1¡NAt¡1¤ if F6 (Xt) = F4 (Xt) ;©
1¡NAt¡1
ª
if F6 (Xt) > F4 (Xt)
where
Xt ´
¡
NAt ; N
A
t¡1 ¡NABt ; 1¡NAt ; 1¡NAt¡1 ¡NBAt ; NABt ; NBAt
¢
:
A temporary equilibrium exists if for any two vectors
¡
NAt+1; N
AB
t+1 ;N
BA
t+1
¢
and¡
NAt¡1;N
AB
t¡1; N
BA
t¡1
¢
there is a vector
¡
NAt ;N
AB
t ; N
BA
t
¢
satisfying this system. This
is the case by Kakutani’s …xed point theorem. Given a suitable form of the
production function, the equilibrium vector
¡
NAt ; N
AB
t ; N
BA
t
¢
is strictly between
(0; 0; 0) and
¡
1;NAt¡1; 1¡NAt¡1
¢
. So the temporary equilibrium is characterized
by
F1 (Xt) + ½F2 (Xt+1) = F3 (Xt) + ½F4 (Xt+1) ;
F5 (Xt) = F2 (Xt) ;
F6 (Xt) = F4 (Xt) :
These equilibrium conditions are identical to the maximum conditions of the
central planner in (18). The decentralized and the centralized economy therefore
lead to the same allocation.
Appendix B
Here we derive the sign and the absolute value of the characteristic roots deter-
mining the dynamics of the model presented in section 2. According to (11), the
characteristic roots are
R1 = ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2;
R2 = ¡H1
2
+
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2
withH1 being unknown andH2 = 1=½ > 1. They are real ifH1 =2
¡¡2pH2; 2pH2¢.
If H1 2
¡¡2pH2; 2pH2¢, they are complex.
We …rst examine the sign of R1. Since the sign is only de…ned for real num-
bers, it is su¢cient to study the case where H1 =2
¡¡2pH2; 2pH2¢. We must
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distinguish between two cases. If H1 2
¡¡1;¡2pH2¤, we have
R1 = ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2 > ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
H1
2
¶2
= ¡H1
2
+
H1
2
= 0.
If H1 2
£
2
p
H2;1
¢
, we have
R1 = ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2 < 0:
So R1 > 0 if H1 2
¡¡1;¡2pH2¤, and R1 < 0 if H1 2 £2pH2;1¢. This result
is summarized in the third column of table 1.
We now turn to the sign of R2. It is again su¢cient to examine the cases
where H1 =2
¡¡2pH2; 2pH2¢. If H1 2 ¡¡1;¡2pH2¤, we have
R2 = ¡H1
2
+
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2 > 0:
If H1 2
£
2
p
H2;1
¢
, we have
R2 = ¡H1
2
+
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2 < ¡H1
2
+
sµ
H1
2
¶2
= ¡H1
2
+
H1
2
= 0:
Therefore R2 > 0 if H1 2
¡¡1;¡2pH2¤, and R2 < 0 if H1 2 £2pH2;1¢. This
result is summarized in the …fth column of table 1.
Next we determine the absolute value of R1. Since the absolute value is
de…ned for real and complex numbers, we can no longer ignore the case where
H1 2
¡¡2pH2; 2pH2¢. In sum, we must distinguish between …ve cases. If
H1 2 (¡1;¡1¡H2), we have H2 < ¡1¡H1 and H1+22 < 0 so that
R1 = ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2 < ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡ (¡1¡H1)
= ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
H1 + 2
2
¶2
= ¡H1
2
+
H1 + 2
2
= 1:
If H1 = ¡1¡H2, we have H2 = ¡1¡H1 and H1+22 < 0 so that
R1 = ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2 = ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡ (¡1¡H1)
= ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
H1 + 2
2
¶2
= ¡H1
2
+
H1 + 2
2
= 1:
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If H1 2
¡¡1¡H2;¡2pH2¤, we have H2 > ¡1¡H1 and H1+22 < 0 so that
R1 = ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2 > ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡ (¡1¡H1)
= ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
H1 + 2
2
¶2
= ¡H1
2
+
H1 + 2
2
= 1:
If H1 2
¡¡2pH2; 2pH2¢, R1 is complex so that
jR1j =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¡H12 ¡
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¡H12 ¡ i
s
H2 ¡
µ
H1
2
¶2 ¯¯¯¯¯¯
=
sµ
¡H1
2
¶2
+H2 ¡
µ
H1
2
¶2
=
p
H2 > 1:
If H1 2
£
2
p
H2;1
¢
, we have
R1 = ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2 · ¡H1
2
¡
sµ
2
p
H2
2
¶2
¡H2
= ¡H1
2
· ¡2
p
H2
2
< ¡1:
So jR1j < 1 if H1 2 (¡1;¡1¡H2), jR1j = 1 if H1 = ¡1¡H2, and jR1j > 1 if
H1 2 (¡1¡H2;1). This result is summarized in the fourth column of table 1.
Finally we determine the absolute value of R2. We must distinguish between
…ve cases again. If H1 2
¡¡1;¡2pH2¤, we have
R2 = ¡H1
2
+
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2 ¸ ¡H1
2
+
sµ¡2pH2
2
¶2
¡H2
= ¡H1
2
¸ ¡¡2
p
H2
2
> 1:
If H1 2
¡¡2pH2; 2pH2¢, R2 is complex so that
jR2j =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¡H12 +
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¡H12 + i
s
H2 ¡
µ
H1
2
¶2 ¯¯¯¯¯¯
=
sµ
¡H1
2
¶2
+H2 ¡
µ
H1
2
¶2
=
p
H2 > 1:
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If H1 2
£
2
p
H2; 1 +H2
¢
, we have H2 > ¡1 +H1 and H1¡22 > 0 so that
R2 = ¡H1
2
+
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2 < ¡H1
2
+
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡ (¡1 +H1)
= ¡H1
2
+
sµ
H1 ¡ 2
2
¶2
= ¡H1
2
+
H1 ¡ 2
2
= ¡1:
If H1 = 1 +H2, we have H2 = ¡1 +H1 and H1¡22 > 0 so that
R2 = ¡H1
2
+
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2 = ¡H1
2
+
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡ (¡1 +H1)
= ¡H1
2
+
sµ
H1 ¡ 2
2
¶2
= ¡H1
2
+
H1 ¡ 2
2
= ¡1:
If H1 2 (1 +H2;1), we have H2 < ¡1 +H1 and H1¡22 > 0 so that
R2 = ¡H1
2
+
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡H2 > ¡H1
2
+
sµ
H1
2
¶2
¡ (¡1 +H1)
= ¡H1
2
+
sµ
H1 ¡ 2
2
¶2
= ¡H1
2
+
H1 ¡ 2
2
= ¡1:
So jR2j > 1 if H1 2 (¡1; 1 +H2), jR2j = 1 if H1 = 1 + H2, and jR2j < 1 if
H1 2 (1 +H2;1). This result is summarized in the last column of table 1.
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